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Abstract: What obligations are there on voters? This paper argues that voters should make their 
electoral decision competently, and does so by developing on a recent proposal for democratic 
legitimacy. It then explores three problems arising from this ‘competency obligation’. First, how 
should voters be competent? I propose three conditions required for voter competence. Second, 
how competent should voters be? I argue that that the competency required tracks the 
significance of the consequences of the vote. The threshold for competency can therefore be 
high or low. Third, if the electorate are unlikely to deliver a competent decision, should suffrage 
be restricted to the competent alone? I defend unrestricted suffrage on the grounds that 
restricting suffrage cannot guarantee a competently made electoral decision. Instead, obligations 
on voters should be minimised by political parties satisfying their obligations to be politically 
sound; if they are sound, then the obligation to be competent can be easily satisfied by voters. 
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1. Introduction 
Modern representative democracies grant voting rights to the majority of their citizens. But what 
obligations, if any, does the right to vote place on voters? This paper argues for one component 
to voter obligation, which arises from a recent account of democratic legitimacy. It then explores 
the consequences of this obligation for the issue of who should have the right to vote.  
The recent account of democratic legitimacy, developed by Jason Brennan (2011; 2016), 
maintains that the decision-makers in a democratic procedure must be sufficiently competent to 
make the required decision, and must arrive at the decision in a sufficiently competent way. The 
competence of the decision-makers concerns their moral character, their epistemic capacities, and 
their relevant knowledge base. Arriving at the decision in a competent way requires the decision-
makers to make the decision in a morally appropriate way, and to properly base their decision on 
relevant epistemic grounds. Only if these conditions are satisfied, according to this theory, will the 
democratic decision be legitimate. In a representative election, then, we can derive the following 
obligation: voters should be sufficiently competent – both morally and epistemically – and should 
make their decision in a sufficiently competent way. Call this the competence obligation. 
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 Although I agree with the central argument for the view that competence is required for 
democratic legitimacy, critical assessment of the argument reveals several outstanding and 
subsidiary problems. In this paper I address three of these issues in order to determine whether, 
and to what extent, the competence obligation holds, and the significance it has for voting rights.  
First, it’s not entirely clear how voters should be competent. What knowledge is relevant to voter 
competence? In what way should voters be moral? I derive three principles that constitute the 
competence obligation, and explore what evidence and facts should be sought for voters to be 
epistemically competent. 
Second, it’s not clear how competent voters should be. Moral and epistemic competence comes 
in degrees, so we need to know what the thresholds are for competence in order that democracy 
be legitimate. My position on this will be that the competence required for legitimacy tracks the 
significance of the consequences of the vote. If the outcome of the vote will have significantly 
negative or positive consequences, then the competence of the voters must be relatively higher 
than it would be if the outcome of the vote would have insignificant consequences. A way of 
minimising the consequences of the vote comes from what I call the political soundness of both the 
political parties that voters can choose from, and the political environment citizens are voting 
within. ‘Political soundness’ concerns the justification of the policies chosen by the political parties, 
and the justness of the institutions constitutive of the political system, such as the rule of law and 
the freedom of the press. When political soundness is high, I propose that voters need only have 
low competence, but when political soundness is low, the voters need to have higher levels of 
competence. 
The third issue I address follows from the second. Given what has been argued concerning 
democratic legitimacy, it seems that there will be cases where a democracy constituted by unrestricted 
suffrage would be illegitimate – where the competence of the voters would be insufficient to render 
the vote legitimate.1 If that’s the case, then should voting rights be restricted from some to ensure 
we can arrive at legitimate decision-making? Advocates of this position are advancing varieties of 
 
1 In modern democracies, suffrage is restricted only for reasons that are commonly thought to be justified. 
This means that voting rights are not withheld for arbitrary reasons like race, social class or gender, but 
only on non-arbitrary grounds such as age, and are therefore distributed as widely as is thought to be 
reasonable. Suffrage is unrestricted in this normative sense. No democratic system currently offers completely 
unrestricted or universal suffrage, i.e. voting rights to every person in the nation. 
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what has come to be called epistocracy.2 I argue that restricting suffrage to the competent won’t 
ensure arriving at legitimate decision-making. If citizens are unlikely to fulfil their obligations qua 
voters, rather than taking away their voting rights, I propose that more needs to be done to ensure 
that voters can fulfil their obligations. One of the ways to do this is to alter the contextual factors 
in such a way that there are lower levels of obligations on voters, namely, by reducing the 
significance of their vote by improving political soundness.  
Finally, I propose that if the level of obligation on voters is low, that needn’t give voters a 
reason to be disinterested in politics. One reason is because taking an interest in political affairs, 
even when their obligations to be competent are low, will lead to greater soundness within political 
parties and institutions. 
In §2 of this paper, I outline and defend the central argument for the competence 
obligation, which I derive from the work of Brennan. In §3.1, I explore the first problem by giving 
an account of how voters should be competent. In §3.2, I explore the second problem by 
defending my account of how competent voters should be, in that their competence tracks the 
significance of the vote. In §4, I explore the third problem by defending unrestricted suffrage, and 
by showing why voters ought to take an interest in political affairs. This discussion builds on the 
work from §3.2 by looking particularly at the obligation on political parties to be politically sound. 
 
2. Democratic Legitimacy and Competence 
Governments wield massive amounts of authority over citizens. They determine the rights that 
citizens have, decide how to tax citizens and how to spend that tax, and coerce the behaviour of 
citizens through law and enforcement. Despite this, it’s often argued that the state’s authority can 
be legitimised if it satisfies certain conditions. That is, it can be that the people living under the 
state’s authority have an obligation to obey its authority. Most notably, it is argued that this is only 
the case if the citizens under authority get to vote for which government comes into power through 
a fair democratic process (Waldron 1998, p. 310).3 Only if citizens get a say in who has political 
authority over them, it is often argued, will that authority be legitimate – will the citizens be 
 
2 Epistocracy, or ‘the role of the knowledgeable’, has its roots in Plato’s Republic. The term was coined by 
Estlund (2003). A form of epistocracy was advanced by Mill (1991), and others have recently been proposed 
by Brennan (2016) and Mulligan (2018). 
3 The existence of states in general can be justified through various arguments, for instance, the State of 
Nature tradition associated with Hobbes and Locke. Nevertheless, a particular state must meet certain 
requirements if it is to be legitimate.  
4 
 
required to obey the state’s laws.4 But what is it about the democratic process of electing political 
authority that legitimises that authority? 
 Theories of democratic legitimacy cut across two dimensions: instrumental and procedural. 
Instrumental accounts maintain that democracy is legitimate because it makes correct decisions. 
For instance, the original formulation of the Condorcet jury theorem argues that the greater the 
number of voters, the higher the probability that the majority vote will yield the right answer. More 
recently, Landemore (2012) provides evidence that decision-making mechanisms which bring 
together diverse perspectives outperform decision-making by groups that are less diverse, for 
instance, by groups of experts. Extending either of these views to a political election, it would 
follow that political authority is made legitimate by the electoral decision when the decision is made 
correctly. In contrast, proceduralist accounts maintain that democracy is a legitimate process for 
granting political authority because its decisions are the result of an appropriately constrained 
process of decision-making. Accounts vary on what it is to be ‘appropriately constrained’, for 
instance, whether the process is procedurally fair (May 1952), or the quality of the process of public 
deliberation leading to the decision (Bohman 1996; Manin 1987). 
 Instrumentalist and proceduralist accounts can be combined to create hybrid theories of 
legitimacy. For instance, David Estlund (2008) proposes that democratic legitimacy is the result of 
procedures that tend to make correct decisions. He calls this ‘epistemic proceduralism’. A central 
example that elaborates epistemic proceduralism is the jury decision. Jury decisions are 
authoritative because they’re arrived at through a procedure that tends to make correct decisions. 
So, even if a particular jury verdict is incorrect, the jury’s decision is still legitimate, and because of 
this, its authority is binding on the defendant. This account holds that electoral decisions are 
legitimate and hence authoritative because they tend to be correct, rather than because any particular 
decision is correct. 
Working within this kind of hybrid framework of legitimacy, we can argue that there must 
be constraints on the procedure in question if it is to be legitimate. A highly plausible proposal for 
such a constraint is that juries must be competent and must make their decision competently. This 
point has been defended recently by Jason Brennan. To make this point he develops several 
examples of juries that are unjust due to failures of competence (2011, pp. 703-10; 2016, pp. 151-
62). He asks us to imagine that a jury is deciding the fate of a defendant convicted of murder. If 
the jury bases its decision on any one of five clearly unjustified reasons then the jury’s decision is 
 
4 Note that this is a necessary but not sufficient condition for legitimacy. There may be other conditions 
required. For instance, that the citizens consent to the authority (Pitkin 1965; 1966), and that the authority 
is voted for through a process involving public deliberation (Cohen 1997). 
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illegitimate, and it is unjust to convict someone on the basis of the jury’s verdict. The five kinds of 
juries Brennan considers are those that are ignorant, irrational, impaired, immoral and corrupt. 
Ignorant juries pay no attention to the evidence in the trial, but find the defendant guilty 
arbitrarily on something like a coin toss. Irrational juries follow the evidence given in a trial, but 
decide that the defendant is guilty in a way unrelated to the evidence, perhaps basing it on wishful 
thinking or odd conspiracy theories. Impaired juries pay attention during the trial but aren’t 
cognitively competent enough to process what they hear and so don’t understand it, deciding that 
the defendant is guilty at random or on guesswork. Immoral juries follow the evidence in the trial 
but find the defendant guilty on the basis of prejudice or bias, for instance, finding the female 
defendant guilty whilst harbouring severe prejudices against women. Corrupt juries find the 
defendant guilty on the basis of bribery rather than the evidence presented at the trial.5 
 In each of these cases, it looks unjust to enforce the jury’s guilty verdict because they have 
arrived at the verdict in an illegitimate way. In some cases, these are failures of epistemic competence. 
For instance, the ignorant jury are unaware of the relevant facts, the irrational jury are consumed 
with odd conspiracy theories, and the impaired jury lack the cognitive capacity to process the 
complex information presented to them. Because of their epistemic incompetence, the ignorant, 
irrational and impaired juries base their guilty verdict on reasons irrelevant to the potential guilt or 
innocence of the defendant. And due to this unjustified basing, the decision arrived at is 
illegitimate. The same is true when the jury lack moral competence. The immoral jury are riddled 
with prejudices and biases, and the corrupt jury has been paid off to vote a particular way. There 
is a failure to base verdicts on the relevant facts in both of these cases, making the decision 
illegitimate.6 
 Since these decisions are illegitimate, they lack any binding authority over the defendant – 
the defendant has no obligation to follow the result of the jury decision. And if the jury verdict is 
upheld, then it would be unjust to punish the defendant on the basis of the illegitimate decision 
 
5 There’s a symmetry in this argument with doxastic justification in epistemology. To have doxastic 
justification for a proposition believed, a person must have sufficient evidence to believe that proposition, 
and base her belief on the evidence (Silva 2015). Symmetrically, for the jury’s decision to be legitimate, they 
must have sufficient grounds for the verdict, and base their decision on those grounds. In each of the five 
cases, they consistently fail to meet the condition in the second conjunct – the basing-condition – and in 
some cases they fail to satisfy the first as well. 
6 Perhaps those seeking to justify the rule of the knowledgeable – epistocracy – are focussed too narrowly. 




made by the jury. Particularly so given that the consequences of the verdict will do significant harm 
to her liberty and wellbeing.7  
From the examples of the unjust juries, Brennan argues for what he calls ‘the competence 
principle’: 
It is presumed to be unjust, and to violate a citizen’s rights, to forcibly deprive a citizen of 
life, liberty, or property, or to significantly harm their life prospects, as a result of decisions 
made by an incompetent deliberative body, or decisions made in an incompetent way or 
in bad faith. Political decisions are presumed legitimate and authoritative only when 
produced by competent political bodies in a competent way and in good faith. (2016, p. 
156-57)8 
Four points are worth noting concerning the competence principle. First, as we said above, 
‘competence’ ought to be read broadly to encompass both epistemic and moral competence. 
Second, the principle only applies in cases in which the decisions being made will lead to forcibly 
depriving a citizen, or citizens, of life, liberty, or property, or to the significant harm of their life 
prospects. Third, I take the principle to be necessary but not sufficient for legitimacy. It merely 
spells out conditions on what the competence of the decision-makers ought to be, and how 
competently the decision ought to be made. There can still be further conditions set out, say, that 
the procedure is fair, or that the decision is made in a way that for other reasons usually yields the 
right result. That said, the converse also holds, namely that a failure to comply with the competence 
principle would be sufficient but not necessary for democratic illegitimacy. 
Fourth, the final clause takes the decision to apply not only to jury decisions, but to political 
decisions as well. This involves decisions made by politicians. But crucially, and for our interests 
here, it is also taken to apply to the decision made by the public in a political election. We need to 
look more closely at this fourth point to make a positive case for a competence obligation on 
voters. 
 
7 Note how this is an epistemically proceduralist conception of legitimacy since the outcome does not need 
to be correct. What matters is the process of arriving at the decision in a way that tends to yield correct 
results. Competent juries tend to get the result right, but they could get the conviction wrong. If they do, 
provided it was made competently, the decision is still authoritative, though unjust. And incompetent juries 
can also get the conviction right, if they just guess. But if they do, on this account, their decision is not 
authoritative.  
8 There is a particular version of this given for juries in Brennan’s 2016 (pp. 153-54). For simplicity I have 




 In order to extend the competence principle to representative elections, Brennan considers 
the example of electing the Nazi party to power in Germany in 1933: 
We should not underestimate the damage bad voting can do. Bad voting can be and has 
been disastrous…The voters who put the National Socialists in power in Germany in 1933 
cannot be held responsible for everything their government did. But much of what their 
government did was foreseeable by any reasonably well-informed person, and so their 
supporters were blameworthy. (2011, p. 707; c.f. 2016, p. 159) 
Now, undoubtedly the decision of the German electorate led to the forcible deprivation of citizens’ 
life, liberty, and property, and to significant harm of their life prospects. But is this an electoral 
decision to which we can extend the competence principle? Brennan seems to maintain the 
somewhat controversial claim that if the German electorate in 1933 were ‘reasonably well-
informed’ then they would have had the foresight to predict what the Nazi party would have done. 
Because they were not well-informed then, for Brennan, they are blameworthy for bringing the 
Nazi party into power. Instead, they ought to have been properly informed about the facts of that 
election. And if this claim is correct, then this seems like a case to which we can apply the 
competence principle because it’s open to similar considerations as the jury case. It then follows 
that, for the election of the Nazi party in Germany in 1933 at least, the electorate’s decision was 
illegitimate, and it was unjust to implement the result.  
Brennan’s argument provides us with two general problems for extending the competence 
principle to representative elections. First, are elections always high stakes in the requisite sense? 
Do they always concern the forcible deprivation of citizens’ life, liberty, or property, or to their 
wellbeing? Second, to what extent must voters be competent if they are to avoid making illegitimate 
electoral decisions. I’ll briefly take up the first problem here, and in the next section, will address 
the second problem. 
The competence principle is defended by analogy with a jury trying a defendant for murder. 
In the jury case, it is obvious that their decision concerns the life, liberty, property and wellbeing 
of the defendant. But is this the case with general elections? A reason to think that it is, is because 
governmental policies generally have a negative impact on some people or groups in society. This 
is particularly the case under conditions of scarcity (Rawls 1999, §22), which virtually all 
governments must work within: there is always a balancing act to negotiate between budgetary 
constraints, taxes, borrowing, and the needs of citizens. Due to this, some budgets must be cut, 
with a correspondingly negative impact on citizens in society. It can lead to joblessness, reduction 
in health and social care funding, and limited provision for schools and other public services. 
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 As a current example, consider the economic circumstances facing the UK government 
following the 2008 financial crash. The Conservative-led government elected in 2010, in coalition 
with the Liberal Democrats, faced both huge debt and a significant financial deficit. In order to 
address this, they committed to a policy of austerity to reduce the debt and the deficit. This 
involved making cuts across most government departments, including to health and social care. 
This austerity policy continued for several further years, seeing the Conservatives elected with a 
majority in 2015. 
Now, consider the options facing the voters in the UK during the 2017 general election. 
One could argue that whether or not the Conservative party was re-elected would have the kind 
of impact required by the competence principle. This could be argued from an article published in 
August 2017, which linked the austerity policy of the Conservative party to a sharp increase in 
deaths. Watkins et al. (2017, p. 6) argued that ‘recent constraints in [healthcare] and [social care] 
spending in England were associated with nearly 45000 higher than expected numbers of deaths 
between 2012 and 2014.’ This 2009-2014 projection, reflecting the decrease in health and social 
care funding, was compared with a projection of deaths given the rate of health and social care 
funding from 2001-2010, before there was any decrease. The report adds ‘that the 2009–2014-
based projection entailed an additional 152141 deaths…from 2015 to 2020 compared with the 
2001–2010-based projection’ (p. 5), where funding would not have decreased. 
Now, in the 2017 general election, Labour committed to ending Conservative austerity 
measures and to put the funding for health and social care back into place, whereas the 
Conservative party made no such similar pledge. Hence, it seems possible to argue that electing 
Labour into power in 2017 would prevent circa 50’000 deaths forecast to arise from Conservative 
austerity measures. If that were the case, and the electorate voted for the Conservative party, then 
their vote would concern the life and wellbeing of many people in the UK. So, these kinds of 
considerations give some justification to the view that electing governments involves forcibly 
depriving some citizens of life, liberty, or property, or to significantly harming their life prospects. 
This example may be an exaggeration of the influence of voting, particularly if the claims 
being made by Watkins et al. are not defensible. But it does show that electing one party to power 
has an influence over how a country is governed. Perhaps electing the Labour party to power 
would have increased health and social care spending. Now, I have not selected this example to 
indicate political partiality, or to judge the policies of UK political parties. It simply shows that 
electing governments is subject to the competence principle since that political act can bring harm 
or good for life, liberty, property and wellbeing. And if that’s right, then there’s a clear obligation 
on voters to be competent and to make their decision competently. This is what, in the 
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introduction, I called ‘the competence obligation’. In the next section, we will consider further the 
nature and extent of the requisite voter competence. 
 
3. The Competence Obligation 
3.1. How Should Voters be Competent? 
The five examples of unjust juries that Brennan proposes give us an indication of what is required 
of juries if their decision is to be competent. There are three components to the competence 
required. The jury must:  
(1) Pay attention to the evidence and facts relevant to the trial. 
(2) Process this evidence in a rationally competent way,  
which means both having the cognitive capacity to process the relevant evidence, and not being 
led by prejudices and biases that cause the jury member to misinterpret evidence in unfairly 
negative or positive ways (cf. Mele 2006, pp. 110-11). The jury must also: 
(3) Base their decision on this competence.  
It’s no good carefully working out in a fully rational way that the defendant is guilty, only to make 
your final decision on the toss of a coin. Nor should the person base their decision on the bribery 
of someone else with vested interests in the outcome of the jury decision, nor simply convict the 
defendant so as to harm her because, for instance, the jury dislike people of her race or gender. 
The jury must be competent, in line with (1) & (2), and base their final decision on competent 
reasoning. 
Most of these points can be applied straightforwardly to electoral decisions. (2) & (3) can be 
set out in the following principles: 
Epistemic Capability: Voters must have the cognitive capacity to process the relevant evidence, 
and must not be led by prejudices and biases, which cause them to misinterpret evidence in 
unfairly negative or positive ways. (Representing (2)). 
Proper Basing: Voters must base their decision on competent reasoning. (Representing (3)). 
These principles represent (2) & (3). But what is required of voters to satisfy (1), especially as it 
concerns ‘relevant evidence and facts’? What evidence and facts are relevant to the competence 
required by voters? 
 To address these questions, it should be noted that the discussion thus far has assumed a 
position concerning the nature of voting. Recall that one of the justifications for granting citizens 
the right to vote was that they could choose which government has authority over them. A 
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background assumption made by this idea is that a vote is a resource in the hands of a citizen that 
she can use to influence the outcome of an election. This theory of the nature of voting has been 
defended by Christiano: 
To have a vote in an election is to have certain resources that can be used. To say that 
someone received your vote is to say that your vote was used to advance that person's 
prospects of winning the election. The active feature of voting is captured by the fact that 
the vote must be used by the person to advance whichever alternative she wishes to 
advance. (Christiano 1995, p. 412) 
On this account, a vote is a resource that the citizen uses to bring about a particular state of affairs, 
namely, that the government she wishes to be in power comes into power.9 Of course this can be 
thwarted when she is outvoted, but nevertheless, the vote was used as a resource in an attempt to 
bring into power a certain government. 
 Why ought a voter desire for a particular government to be elected? Two responses to this 
question are generally thought to be warranted. First, if she altruistically desires for the government 
to come into power that she believes will be of most benefit to the interests of the citizens in the 
nation as a whole.10 Second, if she egoistically desires for the government to come into power that 
she believes will be of most benefit to her own interests.11  
 The goal for the voter is then to determine what is in her best interests, or in the interests 
of the nation, or perhaps a mix of these two, and then gather evidence to help her to determine 
which political party in a general election is mostly likely to bring about the desired outcome. Alvin 
Goldman (1999) offers an account of voting and voter knowledge along similar lines. The interests 
the voter would like to see come about Goldman calls the ‘outcome set’, and is determined by 
several variables, for instance, the desirable level of employment, cost of living, provision of health 
care, crime rate, and environmental quality. The voter then faces ‘the core voter question’: which 
of the available parties or candidates would, if elected, produce a better outcome set from my point 
of view? The aim, then, for the voter is to assess the evidence to answer this question. And when 
 
9 For an alternative account that treats a vote like an expression of support akin to a speech act, see Brennan 
and Lomasky (1993). 
10 Voting for the ‘common good’ can be traced to Rousseau (1997).  
11 Lever (2016) argues that it is permissible for voters to not vote for the common good, and Saunders 
(2012) that self-interest is allowed some place in the political arena, at least where justice or the common 
good is indeterminate. 
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the voter gathers the evidence relevant to answering it, Goldman says the voter has ‘core voter 
knowledge’: 
In a particular election, then, we assume that one of the answers to voter V's core voter 
question is true and the other is false. If V believes the true answer, V has core knowledge 
(in this election). If V believes the false answer, V has core error. If V has no opinion, V 
has core ignorance. (Goldman 1999, p. 324) 
We have been considering what evidence and facts are relevant to the competence required by 
voters. Goldman’s notion of core voter knowledge as it relates to the core voter question seems 
like a promising suggestion. However, a caveat is in order here. If we require the voter to have 
core voter knowledge in order to be competent, then we require her to make an assessment of the 
evidence available in answering the core voter question and to get that question correct. But this 
stands in tension with the framework of epistemic proceduralism we have been working within: 
it’s not the correct result that makes democracy legitimate, but following a procedure that tends to 
produce correct results. 
 With this caveat in mind, the following seems like a more consistent principle for voter 
competence (in addition to (2) & (3)): 
Epistemic Competence: Voters must reasonably assess the evidence relevant to determining 
which available parties or candidates would, if elected, produce a better outcome set from 
their point of view (either egoistically or altruistically, or both), and come to a reasoned belief 
about this. (Representing (1)). 
Note that the relevant evidence will differ between voters as determined by their variable interests.  
Before moving on, we need to address an important objection. Suppose someone’s 
interests are deeply immoral and concern serious harm done to other members of society. For 
instance, if someone will be benefitted from the forcible and unjust removal of an entire ethnic 
group from society. This may be the kind of case Brennan has in mind when he considers the 
election of the Nazi party. Someone could satisfy the ‘Epistemic Competence’ principle above by 
correctly identifying which political party will bring about this terrible end. Of course that’s true, 
but it wouldn’t make their vote for that party competent all things considered. For, they will fail 
to satisfy the ‘Epistemic Capability’ principle. It would be akin to the jury convicting someone for 
murder because they dislike people from her race or gender. To be competent one must satisfy all 
three of the principles required for competence. 
 
3.2. How Competent Should Voters Be? 
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We have derived three principles that a voter should satisfy if she is to be considered competent. 
But these principles are vague and so are not entirely informative. Take ‘Epistemic Capability’, for 
instance. To what extent must voters have cognitive capacity? Or consider ‘Epistemic 
Competence’. How far should voters ‘reasonably assess’ the relevant evidence to count as 
competent? My suggestion in this section is that the competence required by these principles tracks 
the possible consequences of an electoral decision. To see this, I want to begin with an example 
which shows that no matter which way the electorate vote, there will be little by way of significant 
change in terms of the life, liberty, property and wellbeing of the people governed. This will be the 
case if it is largely not possible for an elected government to either (a) harm the people that it 
governs, or (b) improve the life prospects of the people that it governs. In what follows, in the 
interests of limited space, we’ll only consider when this is the case from the perspective of (a), 
though a similar case can be made for (b).  
Imagine that two political parties – A & B – are standing for election. They each have 
different policies, but all of their policies are designed to improve the life, liberty, property and 
wellbeing of the people that they govern. Moreover, all of the policies are plausible and carefully 
justified by the political parties that have designed them. Add to this that the political institutions 
and frameworks that governments must work within require extensive accountability. For 
example, that a government must defend each major policy or economic decision that it takes, and 
face having such policies and decisions outvoted by other parties, and by members of their own 
party, if these policies and decisions are unfair, unjust or unwarranted. What’s more, the politicians 
constituting each political party are highly competent, both morally and intellectually, and are held 
publicly to account for their decisions and are scrutinised by a highly competent free press. 
In this example, whichever political party gains power will be constrained in the harm they 
can do to the governed since they must make their decisions within a framework involving 
extensive accountability. In some actual governments, there are constitutional restrictions on the 
state’s activity. For instance, the First Amendment of the US constitution prevents the government 
from harming certain rights and freedoms of its citizens. Moreover, the political party that gains 
power will lack the motivation to intentionally harm the governed. They all have justified policies 
aimed at improving the lives of the governed, and they are highly competent in their ability to 
implement their policies.  
Note how the decision the electorate must make in this example is importantly different 
from the jury case. In the jury case, there is a significant difference for the defendant if they submit 
a verdict of guilt rather than innocence. This is not the case for the election example considered 
here, since, whichever party gains power, the prospects of the electorate will not significantly differ. 
13 
 
That is, the future state of affairs for the governed will be largely similar whether it is party A or B 
that is voted into power.  
Here’s what I’m not saying: under political party A or B, the living situation of the governed 
will be the same. For instance, the ideologically conservative-leaning party, A, and the labour-leaning 
party B, will bring about the same situation for the nation. That’s clearly not true. Parties that are 
ideologically conservative or labour will implement their policies in different ways from each other, 
meaning different tax rates, more or less provision for social housing, more or less power for 
unions, etc. What will be similar, though, are the life prospects for the governed in the very general 
terms of life, liberty, property and overall wellbeing. These things will not be significantly affected 
whichever party gets into power under the conditions I have proposed. We might say that there 
will be relative equality for the governed in the very general terms of life, liberty, property and overall 
wellbeing, regardless of the outcome of the election. 
To help to see this point, it’s worth suggesting some very rough conditions under which, 
in my view, very little would be different for the governed in general terms of life prospects, 
whichever way they vote. We can separate out some of the conditions suggested by the above 
example in the following way: 12 
Justified Policies: The political parties under consideration must all have carefully justified 
policies, either directly or indirectly aimed at improving the life, liberty, property and well-
being of the people that they would govern if elected. 
Just Institutions: The political institutions the government will operate within must be 
transparent and internally democratic, involving a division of power between the institutions 
and requiring major decisions to be publicly justified. 
Political Competence: The politicians involved in each party must be both morally and 
intellectually competent enough to execute the policies their party supports.13 
 
12 These conditions are a broad sketch which align roughly with many traditional Republican and liberal 
tenets. They bear similarity to some of the constitutional conditions Pettit (1997, Chapter 6) discusses. He 
says that these tenets concern ‘established institutional ideals like the rule of law, the separation of powers, 
and democratic accountability’ (p. 172).  
13 Brennan might argue for something similar, given his views on governmental decision making: ‘citizens 
have at least as strong grounds as defendants to expect competence from government officials and decision 
makers as a matter of right’ (2016, p. 156). 
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Accountability: Political decisions must be made public and be open to public scrutiny and 
criticism by a press that are free of any political institution. 
When a government and the political institutions it works within satisfy the above conditions, I 
will say that it is politically sound. Supposing that all four of these conditions are met by parties A & 
B, they are then politically sound. Well, whatever negative or positive impacts there are for the 
governed, such impacts will be largely similar whichever political party gains power. 
 The example is very simplistic, but it provides us with a means of determining how 
competent voters should be. For in this imaginary example, it seems that the voters needn’t be 
particularly competent at all. For, no matter which way they vote, the outcome will be relatively 
identical. So, their competence would make no difference to the consequences of the vote. This is 
clearly not the case for the jury example. One way to put this is in terms of thresholds: the threshold 
for voter competence is very low in cases where the consequences of the vote will be negligible 
regardless of which way the voters decide. For juries, the threshold for jury competence is always 
high. 
 We can think of competency thresholds in terms of the weight of the requirement there is 
to be competent. Consider the competence required to put together furniture. If I buy a piece of 
flat packed furniture with all the screw holes pre-drilled, screws provided, and simple instructions 
for putting it together, then I needn’t be highly competent in putting together furniture. I’ll just 
need some basic reading skills, minor abilities in manual labour, and perhaps the right tools to 
screw together the various parts. But if I’m building the furniture from scratch, cutting the correct 
lengths of wood, sanding it down, varnishing, painting, measuring and drilling, to get it all to 
correct lengths, shapes and sizes, and to get the furniture looking like a completed project, then I 
require a higher amount of competence. I’ll need skills in woodwork, painting and sanding, and in 
using various relevant tools. In this second case, the threshold for the competence required to 
complete the task is higher than in the first case.  
In the context of voters, a competency threshold determines how much competence an 
individual voter, or a collective electorate must have – that is, how weighty the requirements are 
on voters to be competent. This threshold goes up and down, depending on features of the 
context. The feature we are exploring is the significance of the consequences of the vote. When 
the significance of a vote is low, so is the threshold for competence, and conversely when the 
significance is high. 
 Let’s now extend the example to make it more comparable with current western 
democracies. So, suppose that both A & B exhibit political soundness, but also that they typically 
receive around 85% of the vote share. So, in a first past the post system, A or B are highly likely 
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to be elected into power. A & B have rivals though: C & D. C is a politically sound emerging party, 
and D is politically unsound for some reason, say, because its political leaders lack the requisite 
competence to govern, or because its policies are unjustified. C & D typically receive the remaining 
15% of the vote share. If C gets into power, the prospects for the governed will be almost as good 
as if A or B get into power, but if D is elected to power, the prospects will be significantly worse. 
 Here we have a situation in which the competence of the voters does make a significant 
difference to the outcome, but one that is mitigated by various factors. For instance, suppose the 
more competent the voters are, the more likely they are to vote for A or B. That seems to increase 
the obligation on voters to be competent so as to avoid voting for especially D. However, the 
threshold for this obligation is low since it’s highly unlikely that D will be elected because A & B 
typically receive 85% of the voting share in this democracy. So, voters need to be competent 
enough to acknowledge the problems with D, and to some extent C, but that’s a relatively modest 
requirement. 
 I want to press this argument further by considering a third variation on the example. 
Before I do though, I want to consider whether any actual representative democratic elections 
have been held that are similar to either of the above examples. In particular, have any of them 
had parties that satisfy the four conditions above? Although this is an empirical question, it looks 
reasonable to say that representative elections in the UK, say, from 1997 until 2015, have met these 
conditions.14 In the UK, political parties carefully scrutinise and publicly defend their various 
policies, which are meant for the benefit of the people governed. The system of government in 
the UK parliament is internally democratic and highly scrutinised from within and by the national 
free press. Moreover, members of parliament go through a lengthy process of checks before being 
selected as candidates to stand as representatives in local elections, and so must have the 
competence required to participate in representative politics. It seems likely, in my view, that recent 
elections in the UK parliament have met the four conditions above. Moreover, this will be true for 
many – perhaps the majority – of representative democracies in other countries over the last 
several decades and longer. 
We can provide some intuitive evidence for this from an acknowledgement of a somewhat 
negative assumption. Many people who are eligible to vote in a large democracy either choose not 
to vote, or don’t inform themselves to any significant degree before choosing how to vote. This is 
often due to a perception of the inconsequentiality of their vote. There are two respects in which 
 
14 Particularly since the constitutional changes brought in by the Blair labour government from 1997. 
However, things have been quite unstable for the UK government from 2017-2019, and during that time 
it may fail to exhibit political soundness. 
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a vote could be considered inconsequential. The first is that a vote makes no difference because 
there are huge numbers of voters (Brennan 2011, p. 710). The second is that political parties 
regularly offer the same, or similar policies, shaped by the same economic climate, and bound by 
the same political constitution. Sometimes people say they don’t vote because ‘it’s all just the same’, 
meaning that their vote makes no difference because political parties are not particularly different 
from each other. So, even if the outcome of their vote were to decide between one party being 
elected rather than another, then the impact on their lives would still not change in aggregate. This 
is indicative evidence of the perception amongst voters that there will be little significant change 
to their overall wellbeing whomever they vote for. In my view, this perception is correct, for many 
representative democracies at least, even if the perception is somewhat negative. Moreover, it’s 
enhanced by data showing that the turnout for some recent referenda has been higher than for 
representative elections, possibly because people take themselves to be making a decision in which 
there is a significant difference either way they vote.15 
Let’s now consider the third variation on the example. Imagine the situation from the 
second example with parties A – D, but where parties A and B have taken a radical turn in their 
socio-economic policies, and have each appointed party leaders who are unproven and represent 
risky leadership options. Here the voters must be careful. The outcome of the vote could bring 
about harmful consequences for the governed, and they need to give the political parties closer 
attention in their reasoning and deliberation. Perhaps the parties lack political soundness in their 
different respects, and the voters ought to tread more carefully when gathering evidence to answer 
the core voter question. In threshold terms, the voters should have a higher amount of competence 
than they should have in the previous example since the consequences of the vote could be more 
significant. 
It may be that voter competence below the required threshold has been a partial cause of 
the election of various populist parties in recent world politics. A possible example is the election 
of Bolsonaro in Brazil. If the harmful policies of his party were available to the voters then they 
should have not elected his party to power. To do so, knowing what the outcome would be, yields 
the vote illegitimate since they have failed to vote competently. So, for some representative 
democratic decisions, there will be a significant difference for the governed depending on which 
political party gains power. 
 
15 For instance, voter turnout for Brexit in 2016 was 72.2%, but for the general election in 2017 was 68.8%, 
down again in 2019 to 67.2%. 
17 
 
 In this section I have argued that the competence required by the principles set out in §3.1 
tracks the possible consequences of an electoral decision. In some cases, the competence required 
will be very low, in other cases it will be higher. In the final section I consider the implications of 
this argument for the right to vote, and the obligations on government. 
 
4. Restricted Suffrage and the Obligations on Government 
We have seen that citizens who vote require competence, to different degrees, to make a vote 
legitimate. Legitimacy is clearly a valuable property of a democratic decision, so how can we ensure 
we have it? There are at least three possible options. First, the electorate could be trained to be 
sufficiently competent. Second, suffrage could be restricted to the competent alone. Third, the 
competence required by the electorate could be minimised to ensure that citizens can satisfy it. 
The first option is a proposal for improved citizenship education. This may be helpful and go 
some way to enhancing the requisite competence of the electorate. However, this issue has been 
debated at length,16 and so I’ll focus more on the second and third options, particularly since the 
third follows from my arguments in §3.2. 
Could restricting suffrage to the competent alone be a way of ensuring we have legitimate 
electoral decisions? One of the reasons that Brennan develops the argument he does is because he 
wants to argue for a restriction to voting rights.17 Now, I agree that a country’s citizens will not 
always satisfy their competency obligations. There is some evidence to indicate that voters are not 
typically rational (Caplan 2007; Somin 2013), and hence will likely fall below the required 
competency threshold, particularly when the threshold is high. Hence, in at least some cases, 
electoral decisions will not be legitimate. Nevertheless, I wish to show that restricting suffrage to 
those who are competent doesn’t guarantee legitimate outcomes. 
 Restricting voting rights to the competent alone is comparable to only changing jury 
members when it’s been revealed that they are incompetent in an important respect that will likely 
yield the outcome of their decision illegitimate. For instance, if the jury member has been 
discovered to harbour severe prejudices against the defendant on the grounds of gender, or 
belongs to a racist group, or has been bribed to vote a particular way. In the jury case it seems 
morally required to remove the jury member under such circumstances. However, in the case of 
 
16 For instance, see the collections by McDonough and Feinberg (2005) and Macleod and Tappolet (2019). 
17 Although he does propose ways of retaining unrestricted suffrage, but where a competent ‘epistocratic 
council’ can ‘veto any (or almost any) political decisions made by the general electorate or its representatives’ 
(2016, p. 216). 
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elections, there is a problem with the idea of restricting suffrage rights. For, even if you restrict 
voting rights to those who are competent, you can’t guarantee a legitimate decision-making process 
that satisfies the competence obligation. Why should this be the case? Well, consider the following 
example.  
There is a general election approaching in a country C, which has a population of 40 million 
eligible voters. Now, suppose that in order for these voters to keep their right to vote, they must 
meet a certain competency threshold determined by a competency exam (see Brennan 2016, pp. 
211-14). We could determine the competence required for this exam along the lines of the 
argument from §3.2 in that we set a threshold for competence given the consequences of the 
election for the governed.  To pass the exam, citizens in C must be able to exhibit a certain pre-
determined amount of political and economic knowledge. Moreover, would-be voters must be 
able to show, through an implicit bias test, that they don’t hold any significantly problematic biases, 
and any biases you do have are presented to them so that they’re aware of them whilst deliberating.  
Suppose that the consequences of the vote will be significant – the voters’ decision will 
determine the consequences for the governed, in a similar way to the third example from §3.2. As 
such, we might imagine that the bar is quite high on these tests and exams and only 1% of the 
population in C passes. That leaves 400,000 citizens with the right to vote. In this situation, will 
the competence obligation be satisfied? Only partially. For, if the tests and exams do the correct 
work, then we can guarantee that the decision will be made by a competent and morally reasonable 
deliberative body. That is, they will satisfy two of the three principles set out in §3.1, namely, 
‘Epistemic Capability’ and ‘Epistemic Competence’. However, we can never guarantee that the 
decision will be based on competent and morally reasonable deliberation. That is, we can never 
guarantee that the electorate can satisfy the ‘Proper Basing’ principle. For, people can still cast 
deviant votes, make their decision based on a coin toss, read it in the tea leaves, or be paid off for 
their votes, amongst the many ways in which the decision could be arrived at incompetently. 
Hence, guaranteeing the competence of the electorate through restricted suffrage does not 
guarantee a legitimate electoral decision. So, even if a representative election is likely to be 
illegitimate, then this does not clearly support restricting votes to the competent alone. 
 Despite this, there is a way of supporting restricted suffrage to the competent that arises 
from the argument in §3.2. Recall the notion of ‘political soundness’. A politically sound 
government is one that satisfies the principles similar to those stated in §3.2. There are two reasons, 
at least, for why political soundness in an election would be desirable. First, because an elected 
sound government will lead to better prospects for the governed. Second, because when parties in 
a general election are politically sound, there can be greater voter participation without the vote 
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being illegitimate. This is because casting a vote in circumstances where all of the political parties 
are politically sound requires the voters to have a lower level of competency according to the 
principles of the competence obligation. Given this, many more people can take part without 
failing in their obligations.  
Now, the problem with arguments, like those of Brennan, which look to show that the 
democratic process is illegitimate, is that they seek to place obligations on voters to avoid choosing 
governments that will lead to significant harm for the governed. It’s for this reason that he chose 
the election of the Nazi party as a key example. However, this puts an unfairly high obligation on 
even a highly competent electorate. Another way of placing the obligation is on governments to 
be sound so that the voter’s choice is always for a good option. That is, the voters should always 
be looking to choose the best option from a range of sound options. So, we have here not an 
obligation on the voters to be competent, but on the government, and the parties being selected, 
to be politically sound. To return to an earlier analogy, if the government are politically sound, it 
is like giving the voters flat-packed furniture to construct, whereas if they are unsound, it is more 
like requiring them to build furniture from scratch. The voters need more competence in the 
former case than the latter. 
 Perhaps surprisingly, we have generated an argument for restricted suffrage from the other 
direction. For, an obligation on the government to be sound may be better achieved in 
circumstances of limited suffrage. This is because governments will be better if they must work 
harder to justify their policies and decisions to a more competent electorate.18 A more competent 
electorate could, in theory, have more economic and political knowledge, foster less biases, be 
better at deliberating, and be less convinced by political rhetoric than a non-competent electorate. 
During the run up to an election, then, a party seeking votes to gain political power will have to 
work harder to justify policies, and will need to select, very carefully, the representatives to stand 
in each constituency.  
 Although this provides us with a reason to support restricted suffrage, I want to raise two 
concerns for this type of argument. First, why think that a restricted number of competent voters 
would lead to more justified policies in a country with a highly competent free media and press? 
In liberal democracies, the free press and media heavily scrutinise each major policy put forward 
by each political party and are highly experienced at interrogating politicians to put their views and 
policies under pressure. There doesn’t seem to be any particular reason why simply having voters 
 
18 Moreover, some (Cohen 1997) argue that their policies will be more democratically legitimate when there 
is enhanced public deliberation. 
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with a high level of competence, which may well be lower than the competence of the free press, 
ought to lead to more carefully thought out policies. To restrict votes for this reason could simply 
be superfluous in a context where the free press is highly competent, and where they heavily 
scrutinise parties and their policies. 
 A second, more general concern, is that all this discussion has given us is a reason for 
restricted suffrage which must be balanced against other reasons for unrestricted suffrage. 
Restricting suffrage to improve political soundness looks like a reason for restricted suffrage that 
carries a fairly low weight and will be easily outweighed by other considerations. For, even if a 
political party’s policies will be more justified under circumstances of limited suffrage, this reason 
looks to be of lower weight than, say, the intrinsic value in distributing votes equally, or the 
historical importance in ensuring that all citizens have a say in how they are governed.  
 This leads us back to the idea that the central issue concerning representative democracy 
is not around voting rights. Rather, it is about the obligations on voters to be competent and on 
government to be politically sound. And those advocating restricted suffrage on the basis of voter 
incompetence don’t place a high enough obligation on political parties. If they did, they would 
recognise that the more sound the government, the lower the competence of the voters must be. 
In elections, there is an obligation on the political system to present voters with a range of good 
options, not simply on voters to get it right which party will harm them and which will benefit 
them. Where political institutions are sound, and governmental obligations are satisfied, the 
legitimacy of electing those governments will follow.  
 Finally, what does this mean for voters? Well, in some circumstances, the obligation on 
voters to be competent will be high. But I have been arguing that the obligation should be low, 
and will be low, if governments fulfil their obligations. However, if voters have a low obligation 
to be competent, does this mean that they shouldn’t take much interest in informing themselves 
on political matters? Not at all. For, informing themselves properly means that they can vote for 
the party that best serves their own interests, or the interests they believe to be best for the nation. 
Even if voting in an election will have a good outcome no matter which party gets into power, 
those parties still have different policies that meet different interests. This gives voters a reason to 
stay politically informed. Moreover, keeping oneself politically informed will help to ensure 
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